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Abstract. Fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables computation on encrypted data while main-
taining secrecy. Recent research has shown that such schemes exist even for quantum computation.
Given the numerous applications of classical FHE (zero-knowledge proofs, secure two-party computation,
obfuscation, etc.) it is reasonable to hope that quantum FHE (or QFHE) will lead to many new
results in the quantum setting. However, a crucial ingredient in almost all applications of FHE is
circuit verification. Classically, verification is performed by checking a transcript of the homomorphic
computation. Quantumly, this strategy is impossible due to no-cloning. This leads to an important open
question: can quantum computations be delegated and verified in a non-interactive manner?
In this work, we answer this question in the affirmative, by constructing a scheme for QFHE with
verification (vQFHE). Our scheme provides authenticated encryption, and enables arbitrary polynomial-
time quantum computations without the need of interaction between client and server. Verification
is almost entirely classical; for computations that start and end with classical states, it is completely
classical. As a first application, we show how to construct quantum one-time programs from classical
one-time programs and vQFHE.
1 Introduction
The 2009 discovery of fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) in classical cryptography is widely considered to
be one of the major breakthroughs of the field. Unlike standard encryption, FHE enables non-interactive
computation on encrypted data even by parties that do not hold the decryption key. Crucially, the input,
output, and all intermediate states of the computation remain encrypted, and thus hidden from the computing
party. While FHE has some obvious applications (e.g., cloud computing), its importance in cryptography
stems from its wide-ranging applications to other cryptographic scenarios. For instance, FHE can be used
to construct secure two-party computation, efficient zero-knowledge proofs for NP, and indistinguishability
obfuscation [4, 14]. In fact, the breadth of its usefulness has led some to dub FHE “the swiss army knife of
cryptography”[4].
Recent progress on constructing quantum computers has led to theoretical research on “cloud-based”
quantum computing. In such a setting, it is natural to ask whether users can keep their data secret from
the server that performs the quantum computation. A recently-constructed quantum fully-homomorphic
encryption (QFHE) scheme shows that this can be done in a single round of interaction [12]. This discovery
raises an important question: do the numerous classical applications of FHE have suitable quantum analogues?
As it turns out, most of the classical applications require an additional property which is simple classically, but
non-trivial quantumly. That property is verification: the ability of the user to check that the final ciphertext
produced by the server is indeed the result of a particular computation, homomorphically applied to the
initial user-generated ciphertext. In the classical case, this is a simple matter: the server makes a copy of
each intermediate computation step, and provides the user with all these copies. In the quantum case, such a
“transcript” would appear to violate no-cloning. the user simply checks a transcript generated by the server.
In the quantum case, this would violate no-cloning. In fact, one might suspect that the no-cloning theorem
prevents non-interactive quantum verification in principle.
In this work, we show that verification of homomorphic quantum computations is in fact possible. We
construct a new QFHE scheme which allows the server to generate a “computation log” which can certify
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to the user that a particular homomorphic quantum computation was performed on the ciphertext. The
computation log itself is purely classical, and most (in some cases, all) of the verification can be performed
on a classical computer. Unlike in all previous quantum homomorphic schemes, the underlying encryption is
now authenticated.
Verification immediately yields new applications of QFHE, e.g., allowing users of a “quantum cloud service”
to certify the server’s computations. Verified QFHE (or vQFHE) also leads to a simple construction of
quantum one-time programs (qOTPs) [9]. In this construction, the qOTP for a functionality Φ consists of an
evaluation key and a classical OTP which performs vQFHE verification for Φ only. Finding other applications
of vQFHE (including appropriate analogues of all classical applications) is the subject of ongoing work.
Related Work. Classical FHE was first constructed by Gentry in 2009 [15]. For us, the scheme of Brakerski
and Vaikuntanathan [5] is of note: it has decryption in NC1 and is believed to be quantum-secure. Quantumly,
partially-homomorphic (or partially-compact) schemes were proposed by Broadbent and Jeffery [6]. The
first fully-homomorphic (leveled) scheme was constructed by Dulek, Schaffner and Speelman [12]. Recently,
Mahadev proposed a scheme, based on classical indistinguishability obfuscation, in which the user is completely
classical [? ]. A parallel line of work has attempted to produce QFHE with information-theoretic security [22,
18, 20, 17]. There has also been significant research on delegating quantum computation interactively
(see, e.g., [1, 8? ]). Another notable interactive approach is quantum computation on authenticated data
(QCAD), which was used to construct quantum one-time programs from classical one-time programs [9] and
zero-knowledge proofs for QMA [10].
Summary of Results. Our results concern a new primitive: verified QFHE. A standard QFHE scheme
consists of four algorithms: KeyGen, Enc, Eval and Dec [6, 12]. We define vQFHE similarly, with two changes:
(i.) Eval provides an extra classical “computation log” output; (ii.) decryption is now called VerDec, and
accepts a ciphertext, a circuit description C, and a computation log. Informally, correctness then demands
that, for all keys k and circuits C acting on plaintexts,
VerDecCk ◦ EvalCevk ◦ Enck = ΦC . (1)
A crucial parameter is the relative difficulty of performing C and VerDecCk . In a nontrivial scheme, the latter
must be simpler. In our case, C is an arbitrary poly-size quantum circuit and VerDecCk is almost entirely
classical.
Security of verified QFHE. Informally, security should require that, if a server deviates significantly from the
map EvalCk in (1), then VerDec
C
k will reject.
1. Semantic security (SEM-VER). Consider a QPT adversary A which manipulates a ciphertext (and
side info) and declares a circuit, as in Figure 1 (top). This defines a channel ΦA := VerDec ◦ A ◦ Enc. A
simulator S does not receive or output a ciphertext, but does declare a circuit; this defines a channel ΦS
which first runs S and then runs a circuit on the plaintext based on the outputs of S. We say that a
vQFHE scheme is semantically secure (SEM-VER) if for all adversaries A there exists a simulator S such
that the channels ΦA and ΦS are computationally indistinguishable.
2. Indistinguishability (IND-VER). Consider the following security game. Based on a hidden coin flip
b, A participates in one of two protocols. For b = 0, this is normal vQFHE. For b = 1, this is a modified
execution, where we secretly swap out the plaintext ρA to a private register (replacing it with a fixed
state), apply the desired circuit to ρA, and then swap ρA back in; we then discard this plaintext if VerDec
rejects the outputs of A. Upon receiving the final plaintext of the protocol, A must guess the bit b. A
vQFHE scheme is IND-VER if, for all A, the success probability is at most 1/2 + negl(n).
3. New relations between security definitions. If we restrict SEM-VER to empty circuit case, we
recover (the computational version of) the definition of quantum authentication [13, 7]. SEM-VER (resp.,
IND-VER) generalizes computational semantic security SEM (resp., indistinguishability IND) for quantum
encryption [6, 3]. We generalize SEM ⇔ IND [3] as follows.
Theorem 1. A vQFHE scheme satisfies SEM-VER iff it satisfies IND-VER.
2
A scheme for vQFHE for poly-size quantum circuits. Our main result is a vQFHE scheme which admits
verification of arbitrary polynomial-size quantum circuits. The verification in our scheme is almost entirely
classical. In fact, we can verify classical input/output computations using purely classical verification. The
main technical ingredients are (i.) classical FHE with NC1 decryption [5], (ii.) the trap code for computing on
authenticated quantum data [19, 9, 7], and (iii.) the “garden-hose gadgets” from the first QFHE scheme [12].
The scheme is called TrapTP; a brief sketch is as follows.
1. Key Generation (KeyGen). We generate keys for the classical FHE scheme, as well as some encrypted
auxiliary states (see evaluation below). This procedure requires the generation of single-qubit and two-
qubit states from a small fixed set, performing Bell measurements and Pauli gates, and executing the
encoding procedure of a quantum error-correcting code on which the trap code is based.
2. Encryption (Enc). We encrypt each qubit of the plaintext using the trap code, and encrypt the trap code
keys using the FHE scheme. This again requires the ability to perform Paulis, execute an error-correcting
encoding, and the generation of basic single-qubit states.
3. Evaluation (Eval). Paulis and CNOT are evaluated as in the trap code; keys are updated via FHE
evaluation. To measure a qubit, we measure all ciphertext qubits and place the outcomes in the log. To
apply P or H, we use encrypted magic states (from the eval key) plus the aforementioned gates. Applying
T requires a magic state and an encrypted “garden-hose gadget” (because the T-gate magic state circuit
applies a P-gate conditioned on a measurement outcome). In addition to all of the measurement outcomes,
the log also contains a transcript of all the classical FHE computations.
4. Verified decryption (VerDec). We check the correctness and consistency of the classical FHE transcript,
the measurement outcomes, and the claimed circuit. The result of this computation is a set of keys for the
trap code, which are correct provided that Eval was performed honestly. We decrypt using these keys and
output either a plaintext or reject. In terms of quantum capabilities, decryption requires executing the
decoding procedure of the error-correcting code, computational-basis and Hadamard-basis measurements,
and Paulis.
Our scheme is compact : the number of elementary quantum operations performed by VerDec scales only with
the size of the plaintext, and not with the size of the circuit performed via Eval. We do require that VerDec
performs a classical computation which can scale with the size of the circuit; this is reasonable since VerDec
must receive the circuit as input. Like the other currently-known schemes for QFHE, our scheme is leveled,
in the sense that pre-generated auxiliary magic states are needed to perform the evaluation procedure.
Theorem 2 (Main result, informal). Let TrapTP be the scheme outlined above, and let VerDec≡ be
VerDec for the case of verifying the empty circuit.
1. The vQFHE scheme TrapTP satisfies IND-VER security.
2. The scheme (KeyGen,Enc,VerDec≡) is authenticating [13] and IND-CPA [6].
Application: quantum one-time programs. A one-time program (or OTP) is a device which implements a
circuit, but self-destructs after the first use. OTPs are impossible without hardware assumptions, even with
quantum states; OTPs that implement quantum circuits (qOTP) can be built from classical OTPs (cOTP) [9].
As a first application of vQFHE, we give another simple construction of qOTPs. Our construction is weaker,
since it requires a computational assumption. On the other hand, it is conceptually very simple and serves to
demonstrates the power of verification. In our construction, the qOTP for a quantum circuit C is simply
a (vQFHE) encryption of C together with a cOTP for verifying the universal circuit. To use the resulting
qOTP, the user attaches their desired input, homomorphically evaluates the universal circuit, and then plugs
their computation log into the cOTP to retrieve the final decryption keys.
Preliminaries. Our exposition assumes a working knowledge of basic quantum information and the associated
notation. As for the particular notation of quantum gates, the gates (H,P,CNOT) generate the so-called
Clifford group (which can also be defined as the normalizer of the Pauli group); it includes the Pauli gates X
and Z. In order to implement arbitrary unitary operators, it is sufficient to add the T gate (also known as the
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pi/8 gate). Finally, we can reach universal quantum computation by adding single-qubit measurements in the
computational basis.
We will frequently make use of several standard cryptographic ingredients, as follows. The quantum one-
time pad (QOTP) will be used for information-theoretically secret one-time encryption. In its encryption phase,
two bits a, b ∈ {0, 1} are selected at random, and the map XaZb is applied to the input, projecting it to the
maximally-mixed state. We will also need the computational security notions for quantum secrecy, including
indistinguishability (IND, IND-CPA) [6] and semantic security (SEM) [3]. For quantum authentication, we
will refer to the security definition of Dupuis, Nielsen and Salvail [13]. We will also make frequent use of the
trap code for quantum authentication, described below in Section 3. For a security proof and methods for
interactive computation on this code, see [9]. Finally, we will also use classical fully-homomorphic encryption
(FHE). In brief, an FHE scheme consists of classical algorithms (KeyGen,Enc,Eval,Dec) for (respectively)
generating keys, encrypting plaintexts, homomorphically evaluating circuits on ciphertexts, and decrypting
ciphertexts. We will use FHE schemes which are quantum-secure and whose Dec circuits are in NC1 (see,
e.g., [5]).
2 A new primitive: verifiable QFHE
We now define verified quantum fully-homomorphic encryption (or vQFHE), in the symmetric-key setting.
The public-key case is a straightforward modification.
Basic definition. The definition has two parameters: the class C of circuits which the user can verify, and
the class V of circuits which the user needs to perform in order to verify. We are interested in cases where C
is stronger than V.
Definition 1 (vQFHE). Let C and V be (possibly infinite) collections of quantum circuits. A (C,V)-vQFHE
scheme is a set of four QPT algorithms:
– KeyGen : {1}κ → K×D(HE) (security parameter → private key, eval key);
– Enc : K ×D(HX)→ D(HC) (key, ptext → ctext);
– Eval : C ×D(HCE)→ L×D(HC) (circuit, eval key, ctext → log, ctext);
– VerDec : K × C × L ×D(HC)→ D(HX)× {acc, rej}
such that (i.) the circuits of VerDec belong to the class V, and (ii.) for all (sk, ρevk)← KeyGen, all circuits
c ∈ C, and all ρ ∈ D(HXR),∥∥VerDecsk(c,Eval(c,Enck(ρ), ρevk))− Φc(ρ)⊗ |acc〉〈acc|)∥∥1 ≤ negl(κ) ,
where R is a reference and the maps implicitly act on appropriate spaces.
We will refer to condition (ii.) as correctness. It is implicit in the definition that the classical registers K,L
and the quantum registers E,X,C are really infinite families of registers, each consisting of poly(κ)-many
(qu)bits. In some later definitions, it will be convenient to use a version of VerDec which also outputs a copy
of the (classical) description of the circuit c.
Compactness. We note that there are trivial vQFHE schemes for some choices of (C,V) (e.g., if C ⊂ V, then
the user can simply authenticate the ciphertext and then perform the computation during decryption). Earlier
work on quantum and classical homomorphic encryption required compactness, meaning that the size of the
decrypt circuit should not scale with the size of the homomorphic circuit.
Definition 2 (Compactness of QFHE). A QFHE scheme S is compact if there exists a polynomial p(κ)
such that for any circuit C with nout output qubits, and for any input ρX , the complexity of applying S.Dec to
S.EvalC(S.Encsk(ρX), ρevk) is at most p(nout, κ).
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When considering QFHE with verification, however, some tension arises. On one hand, trivial schemes like
the above still need to be excluded. On the other hand, verifying that a circuit C has been applied requires
reading a description of C, which violates Definition 2. We thus require a more careful consideration of the
relationship between the desired circuit C ∈ C and the verification circuit V ∈ V. In our work, we will allow
the number of classical gates in V to scale with the size of C. We propose a new definition of compactness in
this context.
Definition 3 (Compactness of vQFHE (informal)). A vQFHE scheme S is compact if S.VerDec is
divisible into a classical verification procedure S.Ver (outputting only an accept/reject flag), followed by a
quantum decryption procedure S.Dec. The running time of S.Ver is allowed to depend on the circuit size, but
the running time of S.Dec is not.
The procedure S.Dec is not allowed to receive and use any other information from S.Ver than whether or
not it accepts or rejects. This prevents the classical procedure S.Ver from de facto performing part of the
decryption work (e.g., by computing classical decryption keys). In Section 3, we will see a scheme that does
not fulfill compactness for this reason.
Definition 4 (Compactness of vQFHE (formal)). A vQFHE scheme S is compact if there exists a
polynomial p such that S.VerDec can be written as S.Dec ◦ S.Ver, and the output ciphertext space D(HC) can
be written as a classical-quantum state space A×D(HB), where (i.) S.Ver : K × C × L ×A → {acc, rej} is
a classical polynomial-time algorithm, and (ii.) S.Dec : {acc, rej} × K ×D(HC) → D(HX) × {acc, rej} is a
quantum algorithm such that for any circuit C with nout output qubits and for any input ρX , S.Dec runs in
time p(nout, κ) on the output of S.Eval
C(S.Enc(ρX), ρevk).
Note that in the above definition, the classical registers K and A are copied and fed to both S.Dec and S.Ver.
For privacy, we say that a vQFHE scheme is private if its ciphertexts are indistinguishable under chosen
plaintext attack (IND-CPA) [6, 12].
Secure verifiability. In this section, we formalize the concept of verifiability. Informally, one would like the
scheme to be such that whenever VerDec accepts, the output can be trusted to be close to the desired output.
We will consider two formalizations of this idea: a semantic one, and an indistinguishability-based one.
Our semantic definition will state that every adversary with access to the ciphertext can be simulated
by a simulator that only has access to an ideal functionality that simply applies the claimed circuit. It is
inspired by quantum authentication [13, 7] and semantic secrecy [3].
The real-world scenario (Figure 1, top) begins with a state ρXR1R2 prepared by a QPT (“message
generator”) M. The register X (plaintext) is subsequently encrypted and sent to the adversary A. The
registers R1 and R2 contain side information. The adversary acts on the ciphertext and R1, producing some
output ciphertext CX′ , a circuit description c, and a computation log log. These outputs are then sent to the
verified decryption function. The output, along with R2, is sent to a distinguisher D, who produces a bit 0 or
1.
In the ideal-world scenario (Figure 1, bottom), the plaintext X is not encrypted or sent to the simulator
S. The simulator outputs a circuit c and chooses whether to accept or reject. The channel Φc implemented
by c is applied to the input register X directly. If reject is chosen, the output register X ′ is traced out and
replaced by the fixed state Ω; this controlled-channel is denoted ctrl-.
Definition 5 (κ-SEM-VER). A vQFHE scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Eval,VerDec) is semantically κ-verifiable if
for any QPT adversary A, there exists a QPT S such that for all QPTs M and D,∣∣∣∣Pr [D(RealAsk(M(ρevk))) = 1]− Pr [D(IdealSsk(M(ρevk))) = 1]∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(κ),
where RealAsk = VerDecsk ◦ A ◦ Encsk and IdealSsk = ctrl-  ◦Φc ◦ Ssk, and the probability is taken over
(ρevk, sk)← KeyGen(1κ) and all QPTs above.
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Fig. 1. The real-world (top) and ideal-world (bottom) for SEM-VER.
Note that the simulator (in the ideal world) gets the secret key sk. We believe that this is necessary,
because the actions of an adversary may depend on superficial properties of the ciphertext. In order to
successfully simulate this, the simulator needs to be able to generate (authenticated) ciphertexts. He cannot
do so with a fresh secret key, because the input plaintext may depend on the correlated evaluation key ρevk.
Fortunately, the simulator does not become too powerful when in possession of the secret key, because he does
not receive any relevant plaintexts or ciphertexts to encrypt or decrypt: the input register X is untouchable
for the simulator.
Next, we present an alternative definition of verifiability, based on a security game motivated by indistin-
guishability.
Game 1 For an adversary A = (A1,A2,A3), a scheme S, and a security parameter κ, the VerGameA,S(κ)
game proceeds as depicted in Figure 2.
S
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S.Encsk
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×
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•
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A3 r′
Fig. 2. The indistinguishability game VerGameA,S(κ), as used in the definition of κ-IND-VER.
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The game is played in several rounds. Based on the evaluation key, the adversary first chooses an input (and
some side information in R). Based on a random bit b this input is either encrypted and sent to A2 (if b = 0),
or swapped out and replaced by a dummy input |0n〉〈0n| (if b = 1). If b = 1, the ideal channel Φc is applied
by the challenger, and the result is swapped back in right before the adversary (in the form of A3) has to
decide on its output bit b′. If A2 causes a reject, the real result is also erased by the channel . We say that
the adversary wins (expressed as VerGameA,S(κ) = 1) whenever b′ = b.
Definition 6 (κ-IND-VER). A vQFHE scheme S has κ-indistinguishable verification if for any QPT
adversary A, Pr[VerGameA,S(κ) = 1] ≤ 12 + negl(κ).
Theorem 3. A vQFHE scheme is κ-IND-VER iff it is κ-SEM-VER.
Proof. We first show the forward direction. Suppose a scheme S is not κ-SEM-VER. Then there exists a QPT
A such that for all simulators S, there exist QPTs M and D and a polynomial p such that the difference in
acceptance probability is at least 1/p(κ). Choose S to be
S : (sk, ρR1) 7→ trX′
(
(VerDecsk ⊗ IR1)(A(Encsk(|0n〉〈0n|)⊗ ρR1))
)
,
This simulator encrypts a dummy state and feeds it to the adversary; whatever comes out is then checked. Note
that in the accept case, the output is wrong, since the claimed circuit is applied to the dummy state instead
of the real input. This does not matter, however, because the simulator throws out the result immediately.
Since S is a possible simulator, we can let M and D be as given by the assumption that κ-SEM-VER is false.
This allows us to construct a QPT adversary A′ = (A′1,A′2,A′3) for the VER indistinguishability game
VerGameA,S(κ) simply by setting A′1 =M, A′2 = (A⊗ IR2), and A′3 = D. Informally, the probability that
this adversary wins is
Pr[r = 0] Pr[A′3 guesses 0 | r = 0] + Pr[r = 1] Pr[A′3 guesses 1 | r = 1] .
More precisely, it is
1
2
Pr
[
A′3
(
(S.VerDecsk ⊗ IR)(A′2((S.Encsk ⊗ IR)(A′1(ρevk))))
)
= 0
]
+
1
2
Pr
[
A′3
((
IX′R′ ⊗Πacc
)(
(Φc ⊗ IFR′)(σXFR′)
)
+
(
IX′R′ ⊗Πrej
)(
Ω ⊗ σFR′
))
= 1
]
where F is the flag register (accept/reject), and we set (c, σXFR′) = (trX′ ◦ (IX ⊗ S.VerDecsk ⊗ IR′) ◦ (IX ⊗
A′2))(S.Encsk(|0n〉〈0n|)⊗A′1(ρevk)), and Πacc = |acc〉〈acc| and Πrej = |rej〉〈rej|. This can be seen by following
the wires in the indistinguishability game. By our definition of A′ and S, this is equal to
1
2
(
1− Pr
[
D
((
S.VerDecsk ⊗ IR′1R2
)(
(A⊗ IR2)τCXR
))
= 1
])
+
1
2
Pr
[
D
(
(ctrl- ◦Φc ◦ Ssk)(M(ρevk))
)
= 1
]
where τCXR = (S.Encsk ⊗ IR1R2)(M(ρevk)). By the assumption that S is not κ-SEM-VER, this is at least
1
2 + 1/p(κ). Hence, this adversary wins the IND-VER indistinguishability game with nonnegligible probability.
The reverse direction of the main claim is relatively straightforward. From an arbitrary adversary A for
the IND-VER indistinguishability game, we define a semantic adversary, message generator, and distinguisher,
that together simulate the game for A. The fact that S is κ-SEM-VER allows us to limit the advantage of
the semantic adversary over any simulator, and thereby the winning probability of A. For a detailed proof,
see Appendix A. uunionsq
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3 TC: A partially-homomorphic scheme with verification
We now present a partially-homomorphic scheme with verification, which will serve as a building block for
the fully-homomorphic scheme in Section 4. It is called TC (for “trap code”), and is homomorphic only for
CNOT, (classically controlled) Paulis, and measurement in the computational and Hadamard basis. It does
not satisfy compactness: as such, it performs worse than the trivial scheme where the client performs the
circuit at decryption time. However, TC lays the groundwork for the vQFHE scheme we present in Section 4,
and as such is important to understand in detail. It is a variant of the trap-code scheme presented in [9]
(which requires classical interaction for T gates), adapted to our vQFHE framework. A variation also appears
in [10], and implicitly in [19].
Setup and encryption. Let CSS be a (public) self-dual [[m, 1, d]] CSS code, so that H and CNOT are
transversal. CSS can correct dc errors, where d = 2dc + 1. We choose m = poly(d) and large enough that
dc = κ where κ is the security parameter. The concatenated Steane code satisfies all these requirements.
We generate the keys as follows. Choose a random permutation pi ∈R S3m of 3m letters. Let n be the
number of qubits that will be encrypted. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, pick bit strings x[i] ∈R {0, 1}3m and
z[i] ∈R {0, 1}3m. The secret key sk is the tuple (pi, x[1], z[1], . . . , x[n], z[n]), and ρevk is left empty.
Encryption is per qubit: (i.) the state σ is encoded using CSS, (ii.) m computational and m Hadamard
‘traps’ (|0〉 and |+〉 states, see [9]) are added, (iii.) the resulting 3m qubits are permuted by pi, and (iv.) the
overall state is encrypted with a quantum one-time pad (QOTP) as dictated by x = x[i] and z = z[i] for the
ith qubit. We denote the ciphertext by σ˜. See Algorithm 1 for details.
Evaluation. First, consider Pauli gates. By the properties of CSS, applying a logical Pauli is done by applying
the same Pauli to all physical qubits. The application of Pauli gates (X and/or Z) to a state encrypted with a
quantum one-time pad can be achieved without touching the actual state, by updating the keys to QOTP in
the appropriate way. This is a classical task, so we can postpone the application of the Pauli to VerDec (recall
it gets the circuit description) without giving up compactness for TC. So, formally, the evaluation procedure
for Pauli gates is the identity map. Paulis conditioned on a classical bit b which will be known to VerDec at
execution time (e.g., a measurement outcome) can be applied in the same manner.
Next, we consider CNOT. To apply a CNOT to encrypted qubits σi and σj , we apply CNOT transversally
between the 3m qubits of σ˜i and the 3m qubits of σ˜j . Ignoring the QOTP for the moment, the effect is a
transversal application of CNOT on the pysical data qubits (which, by CSS properties, amounts to logical
CNOT on σi ⊗ σj), and an application of CNOT between the 2m pairs of trap qubits. Since CNOT|00〉 = |00〉
and CNOT|++〉 = |++〉, the traps are unchanged. Note that CNOT commutes with the Paulis that form
the QOTP. In particular, for all a, b, c, d ∈ {0, 1}, CNOT(Xa1Zb1 ⊗ Xc2Zd2) = (Xa1Zb⊕d1 ⊗ Xa⊕c2 Zd2)CNOT. Thus,
updating the secret-key bits (a, b, c, d) to (a, b⊕ d, a⊕ c, d) finishes the job. The required key update happens
in TC.VerDec (see Algorithm 4).
Next, consider computational-basis measurements. For CSS, logical measurement is performed by mea-
surement of all physical qubits, followed by a classical decoding procedure [9]. In TC.Eval, we measure all 3m
ciphertext qubits. During TC.VerDec, the contents of the measured qubits (now a classical string a ∈ {0, 1}3m)
will be interpreted into a logical measurement outcome.
Finally, we handle Hadamard-basis measurements. A transversal application of H to all 3m relevant
physical qubits precedes the evaluation procedure for the computational basis measurement. Since CSS is
self-dual, this applies a logical H. Since H|0〉 = |+〉 and H|+〉 = |0〉, all computational traps are swapped with
the Hadamard traps. This is reflected in the way TC.VerDec checks the traps (see Algorithm 3). Note that
Algorithm 3 is a classical procedure (and thus its accept/reject output flags is classical). CSS.ClassicalDecode
is the classical decoding procedure that calculates the logical measurement outcome [9].
Verification and decryption. If a qubit is unmeasured after evaluation (as stated in the circuit),
TC.VerDecQubit is applied (Algorithm 2). This removes the QOTP, undoes the permutation, checks all
traps, and decodes the qubit.
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If a qubit is measured during evaluation, TC.VerDec receives a list w˜ of 3m physical measurement outcomes
for that qubit. These outcomes are classically processed (removing the QOTP by flipping bits, undoing pi, and
decoding CSS) to produce the plaintext measurement outcome (see Algorithm 3). Note that we only checks
the |0〉 traps in this case. Intuitively, this should not affect security, since any attack that affects only |+〉 but
not |0〉 will be canceled by computational basis measurement.Note that Algorithm 3 is a completely classical
procedure. CSS.ClassicalDecode is the classical decoding procedure that recovers the logical measurement
outcome from the physical ones [9].
The complete procedure TC.VerDec updates the QOTP keys according to the gates in the circuit description,
and then decrypts all qubits and measurement results as described above (see Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 1. TC.Enc((pi, x, z), σ)
1: σ′ ← CSS.Encode(σ)
2: σ′′ ← permutepi(σ′ ⊗ |0m〉 ⊗ |+m〉)
3: σ˜ ← XxZzσ′′XxZz
4: return σ˜
Algorithm 2. TC.VerDecQubit((pi, x, z), σ˜)
1: σ ← XxZzσ˜XxZz
2: (σ′, trapsX , trapsZ)← permutepi−1(σ) . trapsX and trapsZ are quantum states
3: Measure trapsX in the computational basis. If not all-zero, return (Ω, |rej〉).
4: Measure trapsZ in the Hadamard basis. If not all-+, return (Ω, |rej〉).
5: σ′′ ← CSS.Decode(first m qubits of σ′)
6: return (σ′′, |acc〉)
Algorithm 3. TC.VerDecMeasurement((pi, x, z), w˜, basis)
1: if basis = + then
2: w′ ← permutepi−1(x⊕ w˜)
3: Check the second m bits of w′. If not all-zero, return (0, rej).
4: if basis = × then
5: w′ ← permutepi−1(z ⊕ w˜)
6: Check the third m bits of w′. If not all-zero, return (0, rej).
7: w′′ ← CSS.ClassicalDecode(first m bits of w′)
8: return (w′′, acc)
Algorithm 4. TC.VerDec((pi, x, z), σ˜, c)
1: for all gates G in c do
2: if G = Xi then
3: x[i]← x[i]⊕ permutepi(1m02m) . update keys (see Section 3)
4: else if G = Zi then
5: z[i]← z[i]⊕ permutepi(1m02m) . update keys (see Section 3)
6: else if G = CNOT then
7: (x[i], z[i])(x[j], z[j])← (x[i], z[i]⊕ z[j])(x[i]⊕ x[j], z[j]) . update keys
8: else if G is a measurement in basis b on qubit i then
9: (ai,flag)← TC.VerDecMeasurement((pi, x[i], z[i]), σ˜i, b)
10: if flag = rej then
11: return (Ω, |rej〉).
12: Execute TC.VerDecQubit on all unmeasured qubits. If it rejects, return (Ω, |rej〉).
13: σ′ ← the list of decrypted qubits (and measurement outcomes ai).
14: σ′′ ← σ′ with all wires that are not part of the output of c traced out.
15: return (σ′′, |acc〉)
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Correctness, compactness, and privacy. For honest evaluation, TC.VerDec accepts with probability 1.
Correctness is straightforward to check by following the description in Section 3. For privacy, note that the
final step in the encryption procedure is the application of a (information-theoretically secure) QOTP with
fresh, independent keys. If IND-CPA security is desired, one could easily extend TC by using a pseudorandom
function for the QOTP, as in [3].
TC is not compact in the sense of Definition 4, however. In order to compute the final decryption keys, the
whole gate-by-gate key update procedure needs to be executed, aided by the computation log and information
about the circuit. Thus, we cannot break TC.VerDec up into two separate functionalities, Ver and Dec, where
Dec can successfully retrieve the keys and decrypt the state, based on only the output ciphertext and the
secret key.
Security of verification. The trap code is proven secure in its application to one-time programs [9].
Broadbent and Wainewright proved authentication security (with an explicit, efficient simulator) [7]. One
can use similar strategies to prove κ-IND-VER for TC. In fact, TC satisfies a stronger notion of verifiability,
where the adversary is allowed to submit plaintexts in multiple rounds, which are either all encrypted or all
swapped out. Two rounds are sufficient for us; the definitions and proof (see Appendix C and Appendix B)
extend straightforwardly to the general case.
Definition 7 (IND-VER-2 game). For an adversary A = (A0,A1,A2,A3), a scheme S, and a security
parameter κ, VerGame2A,S(κ) is shown in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. The game VerGame2A,S(κ).
Definition 8 (κ-IND-VER-2). A vQFHE scheme S satisfies κ-IND-VER-2 if for any QPT adversary A,
Pr[VerGame2A,S(κ) = 1] ≤ 12 + negl(κ).
Theorem 4. TC is κ-IND-VER-2 for the above circuit class.
4 TrapTP: Quantum FHE With Verification
In this section, we introduce our candidate scheme for verifiable quantum fully homomorphic encryption
(vQFHE). In this section, we will define the scheme prove correctness, compactness, and privacy. We will
show verifiability in Section 5.
Let κ ∈ N be a security parameter, and let t, p, h ∈ N be an upper bound on the number of T, P, and H
gates (respectively) that will be in the circuit which is to be homomorphically evaluated. As in Section 3,
we fix a self-dual [[m, 1, d]] CSS code CSS which has m = poly(d) and can correct dc := κ errors (e.g., the
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concatenated Steane code). We also fix a classical fully homomorphic public-key encryption scheme HE with
decryption in LOGSPACE (see, e.g., [5]). Finally, fix a message authentication code MAC = (Tag,Ver) that is
existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA [16]) from a quantum adversary;
for example, one may take the standard pseudorandom-function construction with a post-quantum PRF.
This defines an authentication procedure MAC.Signk : m 7→ (m,MAC.Tagk(m)).
Key generation and encryption. The evaluation key will require a number of auxiliary states, which
makes the key generation algorithm TrapTP.KeyGen somewhat involved (see Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6).
Note that non-evaluation keys are generated first, and then used to encrypt auxiliary states which are included
in the evaluation key (see TrapTP.Enc below). Most states are encrypted using the same ‘global’ permutation
pi, but all qubits in the error-correction gadget (except first and last) are encrypted using independent
permutations pii (see line 15). The T-gate gadgets are prepared by Algorithm 6, making use of garden-hose
gadgets from [12]. The structure of these gadgets is described in Figure 4.
Algorithm 5. TrapTP.KeyGen(1κ, 1t, 1p, 1h)
1: k ← MAC.KeyGen(1κ)
2: pi ←R S3m . S3m is the permutation group on 3m elements
3: for i = 0, ..., t do
4: (ski, pki, evki)← HE.KeyGen(1κ)
5: sk ← (pi, k, sk0, ..., skt, pk0)
6: for i = 1, ..., p do . Magic-state generation for P
7: µPi ← TrapTP.Enc(sk,P|+〉) . See Algorithm 7 for TrapTP.Enc
8: for i = 1, ..., t do . Magic-state generation for T
9: µTi ← TrapTP.Enc(sk,T|+〉)
10: for i = 1, ..., h do . Magic-state generation for H
11: µHi ← TrapTP.Enc(sk, 1√2 (H⊗ I)(|00〉+ |11〉))
12: for i = 1, ..., t do . Gadget generation for T
13: pii ←R S3m
14: (gi, γ
in
i , γ
mid
i , γ
out
i )← TrapTP.GadgetGen(ski−1) . See Algorithm 6
15: Γi ← MAC.Sign(HE.Encpki(gi, pii))⊗ TrapTP.Enc((pii, k, sk0, ..., skt, pki), γmidi )⊗ TrapTP.Enc(sk, γ ini , γouti )
16: keys ← MAC.Sign(evk0, ..., evkt, pk0, ..., pkt,HE.Encpk0(pi))
17: ρevk ← (keys, µP0 , ..., µPp, µT0 , ..., µTt , µH0 , ..., µHh, Γ1, ..., Γt)
18: return (sk, ρevk)
Algorithm 6. TrapTP.GadgetGen(ski)
1: gi ← g(ski) . classical description of the garden-hose gadget, see [12], p. 13
2: (γ in, γmid, γout)← generate |Φ+〉 states depending on gi as in Figure 4.
3: return (gi, γ
in
i , γ
mid
i , γ
out
i )
The encryption of a quantum state is similar to TC.Enc, only the keys to the QOTP are now chosen
during encryption (rather than during key generation) and appended in encrypted and authenticated form to
the ciphertext (see Algorithm 7). Note that the classical secret keys sk0 through skt are not used.
Algorithm 7. TrapTP.Enc((pi, k, sk0, ..., skt, pk), σ)
1: σ˜ ←
∑
x,z∈{0,1}3m
(
TC.Enc((pi, x, z), σ)⊗MAC.Signk(HE.Encpk(x, z))
)
. Algorithm 1
2: return σ˜
Evaluation. Evaluation of gates is analogous to the interactive evaluation scheme using the trap code [9],
except the interactions are replaced by classical homomorphic evaluation. Evaluation of a circuit c is done
gate-by-gate, as follows.
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Fig. 4. A garden-hose gadget consists of a number of EPR pairs, arranged in a specific order (described by the classical
stringgi). The total number of EPR pairs depends on the garden-hose complexity of the function HE.Dec [11, 12]. On
one of the EPR pairs, a P gate is applied (it is of the form (P⊗ I)|Φ+〉). To use the gadget, the evaluator “teleports
in” a data qubit by performing a Bell measurement between that qubit and γ ini . Then, several Bell measurements
are performed on γmidi , causing the data qubit to either pass the P gate, or not. Which measurements are performed,
depend on classical information held by the evaluator (see also Algorithm 13). The data, possibly with a P gate
applied to it, ends up at γouti .
In general, we will use the notation ·˜ to denote encryptions of classical and quantum states. For example,
in the algorithms below, σ˜ is the encrypted input qubit for a gate and x˜ and z˜ are classical encryptions of
the associated QOTP keys. We will assume throughout that HE.Enc and HE.Eval produce, apart from their
actual output, a complete computation log describing all randomness used, all computation steps, and all
intermediate results.
Measurements. Computational basis measurement is described in Algorithm 8. Recall that TC.VerDecMeasurement
is a completely classical procedure that decodes the list of 3m measurement outcomes into the logical outcome
and checks the relevant traps. Hadamard-basis measurement is performed similarly, except the qubits of σ˜
are measured in the Hadamard basis and HE.Encpk(×) is given as the last argument for the evaluation of
TC.VerDecMeasurement.
Algorithm 8. TrapTP.EvalMeasure(σ˜, x˜, z˜, pi, pk, evk)
1: a = (a1, ..., a3m)← measure qubits of σ˜ in the computational basis
2: (a˜, log1)← HE.Encpk(a)
3: (˜b,flag , log2)← HE.EvalTC.VerDecMeasurementevk ((pi, x˜, z˜), a˜,HE.Encpk(+))
4: return (˜b,flag , log1, log2) . b ∈ {0, 1} represents the output of the measurement
Pauli gates. A logical Pauli-X is performed by (homomorphically) flipping the X-key bits of the QOTP (see
Algorithm 9). Since this is a classical operation, the functionality extends straightforwardly to a classically
controlled Pauli-X (by specifying an additional bit b encrypted into b˜ that indicates whether or not X should
be applied; see Algorithm 10). The (classically controlled) evaluation of a Pauli-Z works the same way, only
the relevant bits in z˜ are flipped.
Algorithm 9. TrapTP.EvalX(σ˜, x˜, pi, pk, evk)
1: (x˜, log1)← HE.Evalunpermuteevk (pi, x˜)
2: (x˜, log2)← HE.Eval⊕evk(x˜,HE.Encpk(1m02m)) . this flips the first m bits
3: (x˜, log3)← HE.Evalpermuteevk (pi, x˜)
4: return (σ˜, x˜, log1, log2, log3)
Algorithm 10. TrapTP.EvalCondX(˜b, σ˜, x˜, z˜, pi, pk, evk)
1: (x˜, log1)← HE.Evalunpermuteevk (pi, x˜)
2: s˜← HE.Evaly 7→ym02mevk (˜b)
3: (x˜, log2)← HE.Eval⊕evk(x˜, s˜) . this conditionally flips the first m bits
4: (x˜, log3)← HE.Evalpermuteevk (pi, x˜)
5: return (σ˜, x˜, z˜, log1, log2, log3)
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CNOT gates. The evaluation of CNOT in TrapTP is analogous to TC, only the key updates are performed
homomorphically during evaluation (see Algorithm 11).
Algorithm 11. TrapTP.EvalCNOT(σ˜1, σ˜2, x˜1, x˜2, z˜1, z˜2, pi, pk, evk)
1: (σ˜1, σ˜2)← apply CNOT on all physical qubit pairs of σ˜1, σ˜2
2: (x˜1, x˜2, z˜1, z˜2, log1)← HE.EvalCNOT−key−updateevk (x˜1, x˜2, z˜1, z˜2) . for commutation rules, see Section 3
3: return (σ˜1, σ˜2, x˜1, x˜2, z˜1, z˜2, log1, log2)
Phase gates. Performing a P gate requires homomorphic evaluation of all the above gates: (classically
controlled) Paulis, CNOTs, and measurements. We also consume the state µPi (an encryption of the state
P|+〉) for the ith phase gate in the circuit. The circuit below applies P to the data qubit (see, e.g., [9]).
ρ
P|+〉〈+|P† • XZ PρP†
We define TrapTP.EvalP to be the concatenation of the corresponding gate evaluations. The overall computation
log is just a concatenation of the logs.
Hadamard gate. The Hadamard gate can be performed using the same ingredients as the phase gate [9]. The
ith gate consumes µHi , an encryption of (H⊗ I)|Φ+〉.
ρ
(H⊗ I)|Φ+〉〈Φ+|(H⊗ I)†
{
•
H
ZX HρH†
The T gate. A magic-state computation of T uses a similar circuit to that for P, using µTi (an encryption of
T|+〉) as a resource for the ith T gate:
ρ
T|+〉〈+|T† • PX TρT†
The evaluation of this circuit is much more complicated, since it requires the application of a classically-
controlled phase correction P. We will accomplish this using the error-correction gadget Γi.
First, we remark on some subtleties regarding the encrypted classical information surrounding the gadget.
Since the structure of Γi depends on the classical secret key ski−1, the classical information about Γi is
encrypted under the (independent) public key pki (see Algorithm 5). This observation will play a crucial role
in our proof that TrapTP satisfies IND-VER, in Section 5.
The usage of two different key sets also means that, at some point during the evaluation of a T gate, all
classically encrypted information needs to be recrypted from the (i− 1)st into the ith key set. This can be
done because s˜ki−1 is included in the classical information gi in Γi. The recryption is performed right before
the classically-controlled phase gate is applied (see Algorithm 12).
13
Algorithm 12. TrapTP.EvalT(σ˜, x˜, z˜, pi, µTi , Γi, pki−1, evki−1, pki, evki)
1: (σ˜1, σ˜2, x˜1, z˜1, x˜2, z˜2, log1)← TrapTP.EvalCNOT(µTi , σ˜, x˜, z˜, pi, pki−1, evki−1)
2: (˜b, log2)← TrapTP.EvalMeasure(σ˜2, x˜2, z˜2, pi, pki−1, evki−1)
3: log3 ← recrypt all classically encrypted information (except b˜) from key set i− 1 into key set i.
4: (σ˜, log4)← TrapTP.EvalCondP(˜b, σ˜1, x˜1, z˜1, Γi, pi, pki, evki)
5: return (σ˜, log1, log2, log3, log4)
Algorithm 13 shows how to use Γi to apply logical P on an encrypted quantum state σ˜, conditioned on a
classical bit b for which only the encryption b˜ is available. When TrapTP.EvalCondP is called, b is encrypted
under the (i− 1)st classical HE-key, while all other classical information (QOTP keys x and z, permutations
pi and pii, classical gadget description gi) is encrypted under the ith key. Note that we can evaluate Bell
measurements using only evaluation of CNOT, computational-basis measurements, and H-basis measurements.
In particular, no magic states are needed to perform a Bell measurement. After this procedure, the data is in
qubit γ˜outi . The outcomes a1, a2, a of the Bell measurements determine how the keys to the QOTP must be
updated.
Algorithm 13. TrapTP.EvalCondP(˜b, σ˜, x˜, z˜, Γi = (g˜i, pii, γ˜ ini , γ˜
mid
i , γ˜
out
i ), pi, pki, evki)
1: (a˜1, a˜2, log1)← evaluate Bell measurement between σ˜ and γ˜ ini . a1, a2 ∈ {0, 1}
2: (a˜, log2)← evaluate Bell measurements in γ˜midi as dictated by the ciphertext b˜ and the garden-hose protocol for
HE.Dec
3: (x˜, z˜, log3)← HE.EvalT−key−updateevki (x˜, z˜, a˜1, a˜2, a˜, g˜i)
4: return (γ˜outi , x˜, z˜, log1, log2, log3)
Verified Decryption. The decryption procedure (Algorithm 14) consists of two parts. First, we perform
several classical checks. This includes MAC-verification of all classically authenticated messages, and checking
that the gates listed in the log match the circuit description. We also check the portions of the log which specify
the (purely classical, FHE) steps taken during HE.Enc and HE.Eval; this is the standard transcript-checking
procedure for FHE, which we call TrapTP.CheckLog. Secondly, we check all unmeasured traps and decode
the remaining qubits. We reject if TrapTP.CheckLog rejects, or if the traps have been triggered.
Algorithm 14. TrapTP.VerDec(sk, σ˜, (x˜[i])i, (z˜[i])i, log, c)
1: Verify classically authenticated messages (in log) using k (contained in sk). If one of these verifications rejects,
reject.
2: Check whether all claimed gates in log match the structure of c. If not, return (Ω, |rej〉). . Recall that Ω is a
dummy state.
3: flag ← TrapTP.CheckLog(log) If flag = rej, return (Ω, |rej〉).
4: Check whether the claimed final QOTP keys in the log match x˜ and z˜. If not, return (Ω, |rej〉).
5: for all gates G of c do
6: if G is a measurement then
7: x˜′, z˜′ ← encrypted QOTP keys right before measurement (listed in log)
8: w˜ ← encrypted measurement outcomes (listed in log)
9: x′, z′, w ← HE.Decskt(x˜′, z˜′, w˜)
10: Execute TC.VerDecMeasurement((pi, x′, z′), w, basis), where basis is the appropriate basis for the measure-
ment, and store the (classical) outcome.
11: if a trap is triggered then
12: return (Ω, |rej〉).
13: for all unmeasured qubits σ˜i in σ˜ do
14: x[i], z[i]← HE.Decskt(x˜[i], z˜[i])
15: σi ← TC.VerDec(pi,x[i],z[i])(σ˜i). If TC.VerDec rejects, return (Ω, |rej〉).
16: σ ← the list of decrypted qubits (and measurement outcomes) that are part of the output of c
17: return (σ, |acc〉)
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4.1 Correctness, compactness, and privacy
If all classical computation was unencrypted, checking correctness of TrapTP can be done by inspecting the
evaluation procedure for the different types of gates, and comparing them to the trap code construction in [9].
This suffices, since HE and the MAC authentication both satisfy correctness.
Compactness as defined in Definition 4 is also satisfied: verifying the computation log and checking all
intermediate measurements (up until line 12 in Algorithm 14) is a completely classical procedure and runs in
polynomial time in its input. The rest of TrapTP.VerDec (starting from line 13) only uses the secret key and
the ciphertext (σ˜, x˜, z˜) as input, not the log or the circuit description. Thus, we can separate TrapTP.VerDec
into two algorithms Ver and Dec as described in Definition 4, by letting the second part (Dec, lines 13 to 17)
reject whenever the first part (Ver, lines 1 to 12) does. It is worth noting that, because the key-update steps
are performed homomorphically during the evaluation phase, skipping the classical verification step yields a
QFHE scheme without verification that satisfies Definition 2 (and is authenticating). This is not the case for
the scheme TC, where the classical computation is necessary for the correct decryption of the output state.
In terms of privacy, TrapTP satisfies IND-CPA (see Section 2). This is shown by reduction to IND-CPA of
HE. This is non-trivial since the structure of the error-correction gadgets depends on the classical secret key.
The reduction is done in steps, where first the security of the encryptions under pkt is applied (no gadget
depends on skt), after which the quantum part of the gadget Γt (which depends on skt−1) looks completely
mixed from the point of view of the adversary. We then apply indistinguishability of the classical encryptions
under pkt−1, and repeat the process. After all classical encryptions of the quantum one-time pad keys are
removed, the encryption of a state appears fully mixed. Full details of this proof can be found in Lemma 1
of [12], where IND-CPA security of an encryption function very similar to TrapTP.Enc is proven.
5 Proof of verifiability for TrapTP
In this section, we will prove that TrapTP is κ-IND-VER. By Theorem 3, it then follows that TrapTP is
also verifiable in the semantic sense. We will define a slight variation on the VER indistinguishability game,
followed by several hybrid schemes (variations of the TrapTP scheme) that fit into this new game. We will
argue that for any adversary, changing the game or scheme does not significantly affect the winning probability.
After polynomially-many such steps, we will have reduced the adversary to an adversary for the somewhat
homomorphic scheme TC, which we already know to be IND-VER. This will complete the argument that
TrapTP is IND-VER. The IND-VER game is adjusted as follows.
Definition 9 (Hybrid game HybA,S(κ)). For an adversary A = (A1,A2,A3), a scheme S, and security
parameter κ, HybA,S(κ) is the game in Figure 5.
Comparing to Definition 1, we see that three new wires are added: a classical wire from S.Enc to S.VerDec,
and a classical and quantum wire from S.KeyGen to S.VerDec. We will later adjust TrapTP to use these wires
to bypass the adversary; TrapTP as defined in the previous section does not use them. Therefore, for any
adversary, Pr[VerGameA,TrapTP(κ) = 1] = Pr[HybA,TrapTP(κ) = 1].
Hybrid 1: Removing Classical MAC. In TrapTP, the initial keys to the QOTP can only become known
to VerDec through the adversary. We thus use MAC to make sure these keys cannot be altered. Without this
authentication, the adversary could, e.g., homomorphically use pi to flip only those bits in x˜ that correspond
to non-trap qubits, thus applying X to the plaintext. In fact, all classical information in the evaluation key
must be authenticated.
In the first hybrid, we argue that the winning probability of a QPT A in HybA,TrapTP(κ) is at most negligibly
higher than in HybA,TrapTP′(κ), where TrapTP
′ is a modified version of TrapTP where the initial keys are sent
directly from KeyGen and Enc to VerDec (via the extra wires above). More precisely, in TrapTP′.KeyGen and
TrapTP′.Enc, whenever MAC.Sign(HE.Enc(x)) or MAC.Sign(x) is called, the message x is also sent directly to
TrapTP′.VerDec. Moreover, instead of decrypting the classically authenticated messages sent by the adversary,
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Fig. 5. The hybrid indistinguishability game HybA,S(κ), which is a slight variation on VerGameA,S(κ) from Figure 2.
TrapTP′.VerDec uses the information it received directly from TrapTP′.KeyGen and TrapTP′.Enc. It still check
whether the computation log provided by the adversary contains these values at the appropriate locations
and whether the MAC signature is correct. The following fact is then a straightforward consequence of the
EUF-CMA property of MAC.
Recall that all adversaries are QPTs, i.e., quantum polynomial-time uniform algorithms. Given two hybrid
games H1, H2, and a QPT adversary A, define
AdvHybH2H1(A, κ) :=
∣∣Pr[HybA,H1(κ) = 1]− Pr[HybA,H2(κ) = 1]∣∣ .
Lemma 1. For any QPT A, AdvHybTrapTP′TrapTP (A, κ) ≤ negl(κ).
Hybrid 2: Removing Computation Log. In TrapTP and TrapTP′, the adversary (homomorphically)
keeps track of the keys to the QOTP and stores encryptions of all intermediate values in the computation
log. Whenever VerDec needs to know the value of a key (for example to check a trap or to decrypt the final
output state), the relevant entry in the computation log is decrypted.
In TrapTP′, however, the plaintext initial values to the computation log are available to VerDec, as they
are sent through the classical side channels. This means that whenever VerDec needs to know the value
of a key, instead of decrypting an entry to the computation log, it can be computed by “shadowing” the
computation log in the clear.
For example, suppose the log contains the encryptions b˜1, b˜2 of two initial bits, and specifies the homo-
morphic evaluation of XOR, resulting in b˜ where b = b1 ⊕ b2. If one knows the plaintext values b1 and b2,
then one can compute b1 ⊕ b2 directly, instead of decrypting the entry b˜ from the computation log.
We now define a second hybrid, TrapTP′′, which differs from TrapTP′ exactly like this: VerDec still verifies
the authenticated parts of the log, checks whether the computation log matches the structure of c, and
checks whether it is syntactically correct. However, instead of decrypting values from the log (as it does in
TrapTP.VerDec, Algorithm 14, on lines 9 and 14), it computes those values from the plaintext initial values,
by following the computation steps that are claimed in the log. By correctness of classical FHE, we then have
the following.
Lemma 2. For any QPT A, AdvHybTrapTP′′TrapTP′ (A, κ) ≤ negl(κ).
Proof. Let s be the (plaintext) classical information that forms the input to the classical computations
performed by the adversary: initial QOTP keys, secret keys and permutations, measurement results, et cetera.
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Let f be the function that the adversary computes on it in order to arrive at the final keys and logical
measurement results. By correctness of HE, we have that
Pr[HE.Decskt(HE.Eval
f
evk0,...,evkt
(HE.Encpk0(s))) 6= f(s)] ≤ negl(κ).
In the above expression, we slightly abuse notation and write HE.Evalevk0,...,evkt to include the t recryption
steps that are performed during TrapTP.Eval. As long as the number of T gates, and thus the number of
recryptions, is polynomial in κ, the expression holds.
Thus, the probability that TrapTP′.VerDec and TrapTP′′.VerDec use different classical values (decrypting
from the log vs. computing from the initial values) is negligible. Since this is the only place where the two
schemes differ, the output of the two VerDec functions will be identical, except with negligible probability.
Thus A will either win in both HybA,TrapTP′(κ) and HybA,TrapTP′′(κ), or lose in both, again except with
negligible probability. uunionsq
More Hybrids: Removing Gadgets. We continue by defining a sequence of hybrid schemes based on
TrapTP′′. In 4t steps, we will move all error-correction functionality from the gadgets to VerDec. This will
imply that the adversary has no information about the classical secret keys (which are involved in constructing
these gadgets). This will allow us to eventually reduce the security of TrapTP to that of TC.
We remove the gadgets back-to-front, starting with the final gadget. Every gadget is removed in four steps.
For all 1 ≤ ` ≤ t, define the hybrids TrapTP(`)1 , TrapTP(`)2 , TrapTP(`)3 , and TrapTP(`)4 (with TrapTP(t+1)4 :=
TrapTP′′) as follows:
1. TrapTP
(`)
1 is the same as TrapTP
(`+1)
4 (or, in the case that ` = t, the same as TrapTP
′′), except for the
generation of the state Γ` (see Algorithm 5, line 15). In TrapTP
(`)
1 , all classical information encrypted
under pk` is replaced with encryptions of zeros. In particular, for i ≥ `, line 15 is adapted to
Γi ←MAC.Sign(HE.Encpki(00 · · · 0))
⊗ TrapTP′′.Enc′(sk′, γmidi )⊗ TrapTP.Enc(sk, γ ini ⊗ γouti )
where TrapTP′′.Enc′ also appends a signed encryption of zeros, effectively replacing line 1 in Algorithm 7
with
σ˜ ←
∑
x,z∈{0,1}3m
(
TC.Enc((pi, x, z), σ)⊗MAC.Signk(HE.Encpk(00 · · · 0))
)
It is important to note that in both KeyGen and Enc′, the information that is sent to VerDec through the
classical side channel is not replaced with zeros. Hence, the structural and encryption information about
Γ` is kept from the adversary, and instead is directly sent (only) to the verification procedure. Whenever
VerDec needs this information, it is taken directly from this trusted source, and the all-zero string sent by
the adversary will be ignored.
PHE.Encpk`+1(00 · · · 0) +
γ in` γ
mid
` γ
out
`
Fig. 6. In TrapTP`1, all classically encrypted information for the `th gadget is replaced by zeros. The quantum state
remains the same as in TrapTP (see Figure 4).
2. TrapTP
(`)
2 is the same as TrapTP
(`)
1 , except that for the `th gadget, the procedure TrapTP.PostGadgetGen
is called instead of TrapTP.GadgetGen:
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Algorithm 15. TrapTP.PostGadgetGen(ski)
1: gi ← 0|g(ski)|
2: (γ in, γmid, γout)← halves of EPR pairs (send other halves to VerDec)
3: return (gi, γ
in
i , γ
mid
i , γ
out
i )
This algorithm produces a ‘gadget’ in which all qubits are replaced with halves of EPR pairs. These still
get encrypted in line 15 of Algorithm 5. All other halves of these EPR pairs are sent to VerDec through
the provided quantum channel. TrapTP
(`)
2 .VerDec has access to the structural information g` (as this
is sent via the classical side information channel from KeyGen to VerDec) and performs the necessary
Bell measurements to recreate γ in` , γ
mid
` and γ
out
` after the adversary has interacted with the EPR pair
halves. Effectively, this postpones the generation of the gadget structure to decryption time. Of course,
the measurement outcomes are taken into account by VerDec when calculating updates to the quantum
one-time pad. As can be seen from the description of TrapTP
(`)
4 , all corrections that follow the `th one
are unaffected by the fact that the server cannot hold the correct information about these postponed
measurements, not even in encrypted form.
↑ gadget
↓ to VerDec
P
HE.Encpk`+1(00 · · · 0) +
γ in` γ
mid
` γ
out
`
Fig. 7. In TrapTP
(`)
2 , the quantum state that consitutes the `th gadget is replaced with halves of EPR pairs. The other
halves are sent to VerDec, where Bell measurements (the gray lines) and the phase gate P are applied after evaluation.
3. TrapTP
(`)
3 is the same as TrapTP
(`)
2 , except that gadget generation for the `th gadget is handled by
TrapTP.FakeGadgetGen instead of TrapTP.PostGadgetGen.
Algorithm 16. TrapTP.FakeGadgetGen(ski)
1: gi ← 0|g(ski)|
2: (γ in, γmid, γout)← halves of EPR pairs (send other halves to VerDec)
3: Send γmid to VerDec as well
4: return (gi, γ
in
i , |00 · · · 0〉, γouti )
This algorithm prepares, instead of halves of EPR pairs, |0〉-states of the appropriate dimension for γmid` .
(Note that this dimension does not depend on sk`−1). For γ in` and γ
out
` , halves of EPR pairs are still
generated, as in TrapTP
(`)
2 . Via the side channel, the full EPR pairs for γ
mid
` are sent to VerDec. As in
the previous hybrids, the returned gadget is encrypted in TrapTP.KeyGen.
TrapTP
(`)
3 .VerDec verifies that the adversary performed the correct Bell measurements on the fake
`th gadget by calling TC.VerDec. If this procedure accepts, TrapTP
(`)
3 .VerDec performs the verified
Bell measurements on the halves of the EPR pairs received from TrapTP
(`)
3 .KeyGen (and subsequently
performs the Bell measurements that depend on g` on the other halves, as in TrapTP
(`)
2 ). Effectively,
TrapTP
(`)
3 .VerDec thereby performs a protocol for HE.Dec, removing the phase error in the process.
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|0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉
↑ gadget
↓ to VerDec
P
HE.Encpk`+1(00 · · · 0) +
γ in` γ
mid
` γ
out
`
Fig. 8. In TrapTP
(`)
3 , all of γ
mid
` is replaced with dummy qubits. VerDec verifies the Bell measurements performed on
these dummy qubits, and performs them on the top halves of the corresponding EPR pairs. Like in TrapTP
(`)
2 , VerDec
also performs Bell measurements and a P gate on the lower halves.
4. TrapTP
(`)
4 is the same as TrapTP
(`)
3 , except that VerDec (instead of performing the Bell measurements
of the gadget protocol) uses its knowledge of the initial QOTP keys and all intermediate measurement
outcomes to compute whether or not a phase correction is necessary after the `th T gate. TrapTP
(`)
4 .VerDec
then performs this phase correction on the EPR half entangled with γ in` , followed by a Bell measurement
with the EPR half entangled with γout` .
|0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉
gadget
to VerDec
P?
HE.Encpk`+1(00 · · · 0) +
γ in` γ
mid
` γ
out
`
Fig. 9. In TrapTP
(`)
4 , the state that the evaluator receives is exactly equal to the state in TrapTP
(`)
3 (see Figure 8). The
only difference is the way VerDec applies the P gate (conditionally): instead of emulating the gadget usage, VerDec
directly computes whether or not a phase needs to be applied, and performs the teleportation measurement on γ in`
and γout` accordingly.
The first ` − 1 gadgets in TrapTP(`)1 through TrapTP(`)4 are always functional gadgets, as in TrapTP.
The last t − ` gadgets are all completely replaced by dummy states, and their functionality is completely
outsourced to VerDec. In four steps described above, the functionality of the `th gadget is also transferred to
VerDec. It is important to replace only one gadget at a time, because replacing a real gadget with a fake one
breaks the functionality of the gadgets that occur later in the evaluation: the encrypted classical information
held by the server does not correspond to the question of whether or not a phase correction is needed. By
completely outsourcing the phase correction to VerDec, as is done for all gadgets after the `th one in all
TrapTP
(`)
i schemes, we ensure that this incorrect classical information does not influence the outcome of the
computation. Hence, correctness is maintained throughout the hybrid transformations. We now show that
these transformations of the scheme do not significantly affect the adversary’s winning probability in the
hybrid indistinguishability game.
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Lemma 3. For any QPT A, there exists a negligible function negl such that for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ t,
AdvHyb
TrapTP
(`+1)
4
TrapTP
(`)
1
(A, κ) ≤ negl(κ).
Proof (sketch). In TrapTP
(`+1)
4 , no information about sk(`) is sent to the adversary. In the original TrapTP
scheme, the structure of the quantum state Γ`+1 depended on it, but this structure has been replaced with
dummy states in several steps in TrapTP`+12 through TrapTP
`+1
4 .
This is fortunate, since if absolutely no secret-key information is present, we are able to bound the
difference in winning probability between HybA,TrapTP(`+1)4
(κ) and HybA,TrapTP`1(κ) by reducing it to the
IND-CPA security against quantum adversaries [6] of the classical homomorphic encryption scheme HE.
The proof is closely analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 in [12], and on a high level it works as follows. Let
A = (A1,A2,A3) be a QPT adversary for the game HybA,TrapTP(`)1 (κ) or HybA,TrapTP(`+1)4 (κ) (we do not need
to specify for which one, since they both require the same input/output interface). A new quantum adversary
A′ for the classical IND-CPA indistinguishability game is defined by having the adversary taking the role
of challenger in either the game HybA,TrapTP(`)1
(κ) or the game HybA,TrapTP(`+1)4
(κ). Which game is simulated
depends on the coin flip of the challenger for the IND-CPA indistinguishability game, and is unknown to A′.
This situation is achieved by having A′ send any classical plaintext that should be encrypted under pk` to
the challenger, so that either that plaintext is encrypted or a string of zeros is.
Based on the guess of the simulated A, which A′ can verify to be correct or incorrect in his role of
challenger, A′ will guess which of the two games was just simulated. By IND-CPA security of the classical
scheme against quantum adversaries, A′ cannot succeed in this guessing game with nonnegligible advantage
over random guessing. This means that the winning probability of A in both games cannot differ by a lot.
For details, we refer the reader the proof of Lemma 5, in which a very similar approach is taken.
Technically, the success probability of A′, and thus the function negl, may depend on `. A standard
randomizing argument, as found in e.g. the discussion of hybrid arguments in [16], allows us to get rid of
this dependence by defining another adversary A′′ that selects a random value of j, and then bounding the
advantage of A′′ by a negligible function that is independent of j. uunionsq
Lemma 4. For 1 ≤ ` ≤ t and any QPT A, AdvHybTrapTP
(`)
2
TrapTP
(`)
1
(A, κ) = 0.
Proof. In TrapTP
(`)
1 , the `th error-correction gadget consists of a number of EPR pairs arranged in a certain
order, as described by the garden-hose protocol for HE.Dec. For example, this protocol may dictate that the
ith and jth qubit of the gadget must form an EPR pair |Φ+〉 together. This can alternatively be achieved
by creating two EPR pairs, placing half of each pair in the ith and jth position of the gadget state, and
performing a Bell measurement on the other two halves. This creates a Bell pair XaZb|Φ+〉 in positions i and
j, where a, b ∈ {0, 1} describe the outcome of the Bell measurement.
From the point of view of the adversary, it does not matter whether these Bell measurements are performed
during KeyGen, or whether the halves of EPR pairs are sent to VerDec for measurement – because the key to
the quantum one-time pad of the `th gadget is not sent to the adversary at all, the same state is created with
a completely random Pauli in either case. Of course, the teleportation correction Paulis of the form XaZb
need to be taken into account when updating the keys to the quantum one-time pad on the data qubits after
the gadget is used. VerDec has all the necessary information to do this, because it observes the measurement
outcomes, and computes the key updates itself (instead of decrypting the final keys from the computation
log).
Thus, with the extra key update steps in TrapTP
(`)
2 .VerDec, the inputs to the adversary are exactly the
same in the games of TrapTP
(`)
1 and TrapTP
(`)
2 . uunionsq
Lemma 5. For any QPT A, there exists a negligible function negl such that for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ t,
AdvHyb
TrapTP
(`)
3
TrapTP
(`)
2
(A, κ) ≤ negl(κ).
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Proof. We show this by reducing the difference in winning probabilities in the statement of the lemma to
the IND-VER security of the somewhat homomorphic scheme TC. Intuitively, because TC is IND-VER, if
TrapTP
(`)
2 accepts the adversary’s claimed circuit of Bell measurements on the EPR pair halves, the effective
map on those EPR pairs is the claimed circuit. Therefore, we might just as well ask VerDec to apply this
map, as we do in TrapTP
(`)
3 , to get the same output state. If TrapTP
(`)
2 rejects the adversary’s claimed circuit
on those EPR pair halves, then TrapTP
(`)
3 should reject too. This is why we let the adversary act on an
encrypted dummy state of |0〉s.
Let A = (A1,A2,A3) be a set of QPT algorithms on the appropriate registers, so that we can consider
it as an adversary for the hybrid indistinguishability game for either TrapTP
(`)
2 or TrapTP
(`)
3 (see Defini-
tion 9). Note the input/output wires to the adversary in both these games are identical, so we can evaluate
Pr[HybA,TrapTP(`)2
(κ) = 1] and Pr[HybA,TrapTP(`)3
(κ) = 1] for the same A.
Now define an adversary A′ = (A′1,A′2,A′3) for the IND-VER game against TC, VerGameA′,TC(κ), as
follows:
1. A′1: Run TrapTP(`)2 .KeyGen until the start of line 15 in the `th iteration of that loop. Up to this point,
TrapTP
(`)
2 .KeyGen is identical to TrapTP
(`)
3 .KeyGen. It has generated real gadgets Γ1 through Γ`−1, and halves
of EPR pairs for γ in` , γ
mid
` and γ
out
` . Note furthermore that the permutation pi` is used nowhere. Now send
γmid` to the challenger via the register X, and everything else (including sk) to A′2 via the side register R.
2. A′2: Continue TrapTP(`)2 .KeyGen using the response from the challenger instead of TrapTP.Enc′(sk′, γmid` )
on line 15 in the `th iteration. Call the result ρevk. Again, this part of the key generation procedure is identical
for TrapTP
(`)
2 and TrapTP
(`)
3 . Start playing the hybrid indistinguishability game with A:
– Flip a bit r ∈ {0, 1}.
– Send ρevk to A1. If r = 0, encrypt the response of A1 using the secret key sk generated by A′1. Note that
for this, the permutation pi` is also not needed. If r = 1, encrypt a |0〉 state of appropriate dimension
instead.
– Send the resulting encryption, along with the side info from A1, to A2.
– On the output of A2, start running TrapTP(`)2 .VerDec until the actions on the `th gadget need to be
verified. Since the permutation on the state γmid` is unknown to A′2 (it was sent to the challenger for
encryption), it cannot verify this part of the computation.
– Instead, send the relevant part of the computation log to the challenger for verification, along with the
relevant part of the claimed circuit (the Bell measurements on the gadget state), and the relevant qubits,
all received from A2, to the challenger for verification and decryption.
– In the meantime, send the rest of the working memory to A′3 via register R′.
3. A′3: Continue the simulation of the hybrid game with A:
– If the challenger rejects, reject and replace the entire quantum state by the fixed dummy state Ω.
– If the challenger accepts, then we know that the challenger applies the claimed subcircuit to the quantum
state it did not encrypt (either |0〉 or γmid` ), depending on the bit the challenger flipped), and possibly
swaps this state back in (again depending on which bit it flipped). Continue the TrapTP
(`)
2 .VerDec
computation for the rest of the computation log.
– Send the result (the output quantum state, the claimed circuit, and the accept/reject flag) to A3, and
call its output bit r′.
Output 0 if r = r′, and 1 otherwise. (i.e., output NEQ(r, r′))
Recall from Definition 9 that the challenger flips a coin (let us call the outcome s ∈ {0, 1}) to decide
whether to encrypt the quantum state provided by A′, or to swap in an all-zero dummy state before encrypting.
Keeping this in mind while inspecting the definition of A′, one can see that whenever s = 0, A′ takes the role
of challenger in the game HybA,TrapTP(`)2
(κ) with A, and whenever s = 1, they play HybA,TrapTP(`)3 (κ). Now let
us consider when the newly defined adversary A′ wins the VER indistinguishability game for TC. If s = 0,
A′ needs to output a bit s′ = 0 to win. This happens, by definition of A′, if and only if A wins the game
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HybA,TrapTP(`)2
(κ) (i.e. r = r′). On the other hand, if s = 1, A′ needs to output a bit s′ = 1 to win. This
happens, by definition of A′, if and only if A loses the game HybA,TrapTP(`)3 (κ) (i.e. r 6= r
′). Thus the winning
probability of A′ is:
Pr[VerGameA′,TC(κ) = 1] =
= Pr[s = 0] · Pr[HybA,TrapTP(`)2 (κ) = 1] + Pr[s = 1] · Pr[HybA,TrapTP(`)3 (κ) = 0]
=
1
2
Pr[HybA,TrapTP(`)2
(κ) = 1] +
1
2
(
1− Pr[HybA,TrapTP(`)3 (κ) = 1]
)
=
1
2
+
1
2
(
Pr[HybA,TrapTP(`)2
(κ) = 1]− Pr[HybA,TrapTP(`)3 (κ) = 1]
)
From the IND-VER property of TC (see Theorem 4) we know that the above is at most 12 + negl(κ). From
this (and a randomizing argument similar to Lemma 3), the statement of the lemma follows directly. uunionsq
Lemma 6. For any QPT A, there exists a negligible function negl such that for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ t,
AdvHyb
TrapTP
(`)
4
TrapTP
(`)
3
(A, κ) ≤ negl(κ).
Proof. Let f(s) be the bit that, after the `th T gate, determines whether or not a phase correction is necessary.
Here, s is all the relevant starting information (such as quantum one-time pad keys, gadget structure,
permutations, and applied circuit), and f is some function that determines the X key on the relevant qubit
right before application of the T gate.
In TrapTP
(`)
3 , a phase correction after the `th T gate is applied conditioned on the outcome of
HE.Decsk`−1(HE.Eval
f
evk0,...,evk`−1(HE.Encpk0(s))),
because the garden-hose computation in the gadget computes the classical decryption. In the above ex-
pression, we again slightly abuse notation, as in the proof of Lemma 2, and include recryption steps in
HE.Evalevk0,...,evk`−1 . As long as t is polynomial in κ, we have, by correctness of HE,
Pr[HE.Decsk`−1(HE.Eval
f
evk0,...,evk`−1(HE.Encpk0(s))) 6= f(s)] ≤ negl(κ).
In TrapTP
(`)
4 , the only difference from TrapTP
(`)
3 is that, instead of performing the garden-hose computation
on the result of the classical homomorphic evaluation procedure, the phase correction is applied directly by
VerDec, conditioned on f(s). The probability that in TrapTP
(`)
4 , a phase is applied (or not) when in TrapTP
(`)
3
it is not (or is), is negligible. The claim follows directly. uunionsq
Final Hybrid: Removing All Classical FHE. In TrapTP
(1)
4 , all of the error-correction gadgets have
been removed from the evaluation key, and the error-correction functionality has been redirected to VerDec
completely. Effectively, TrapTP
(1)
4 .KeyGen samples a permutation pi, generates a lot of magic states (for P, H
and T) and encrypts them using TC.Encpi, after which the keys to the quantum one-time pad used in that
encryption are homomorphically encrypted under pk0. The adversary is allowed to act on those encryptions,
but while its homomorphic computations are syntactically checked in the log, VerDec does not decrypt and
use the resulting values. This allows us to link TrapTP
(1)
4 to a final hybrid, TrapTP
f , where all classical
information is replaced with zeros before encrypting.
The proof of the following lemma is analogous to that of Lemma 3, and reduces to the IND-CPA security
of the classical scheme HE:
Lemma 7. For any QPT A, AdvHybTrapTPf
TrapTP
(1)
4
(A, κ) ≤ negl(κ).
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Proof of main theorem. Considering TrapTPf in more detail, we can see that it is actually very similar
to TC. This allows us to prove the following lemma, which is the last ingredient for the proof of verifiability
of TrapTP.
Lemma 8. For any QPT A, Pr[HybA,TrapTPf (κ) = 1] ≤ 12 + negl(κ).
Proof. To see the similarity with TC, consider the four algorithms of TrapTPf .
In TrapTPf .KeyGen, a permutation pi is sampled, and magic states for P, H and T are generated, along
with some EPR pair halves (to replace ini and outi). For all generated quantum states, random keys for
QOTPs are sampled, and the states are encrypted using TC.Enc with these keys as secret keys. No classical
FHE is present anymore. Thus, TrapTPf .KeyGen can be viewed as TC.KeyGen, followed by TC.Enc on the
magic states and EPR pair halves.
TrapTPf .Enc is identical to TC.Enc, only the keys to the quantum one-time pad are sampled on the fly
and sent to TrapTPf .VerDec via a classical side-channel, whereas TC.VerDec receives them as part of the
secret key. Since the keys are used exactly once and not used anywhere else besides in Enc and VerDec, this
difference does not affect the outcome of the game.
TrapTPf .Eval only requires CNOT, classically controlled Paulis, computational basis measurements and
Hadamard basis measurements. For the execution of any other gate, it suffices to apply a circuit of CNOT,
classically controlled Paulis, and measurements to the encrypted data, encrypted magic states and/or
encrypted EPR halves.
TrapTPf .VerDec does two things: (i) it syntactically checks the provided computation log, and (ii) it runs
TC.VerDec to verify that the evaluation procedure correctly applied the circuit of CNOTs and measurements.
An execution of HybA,TrapTPf (κ) for any A corresponds to the two-round VER indistinguishability game
for TC as follows. Let A = (A1,A2,A3) be a polynomial-time adversary for the game HybA,TrapTPf (κ). Define
an additional QPT A0 that produces magic states and EPR pair halves to the register X1. The other halves
of the EPR pairs are sent through R, and untouches by A1 and A2. The above analysis shows that the
adversary A′ = (A0,A1,A2,A3) can be viewed as an adversary for the VER-2 indistinguishability game
VerGame2A′,TC(κ) and wins whenever HybA,TrapTPf (κ) = 1. The other direction does not hold: A loses the
hybrid indistinguishability game if TrapTPf .VerDec rejects check (i), but accepts check (ii) (see above). In
this case, A′ would still win the VER-2 indistinguishability game. Hence,
Pr[HybA,TrapTPf (κ) = 1] ≤ Pr[VerGame2A′,TC(κ) = 1].
Theorem 4 yields Pr[VerGame2A′,TC(κ) = 1] ≤ 12 + negl(κ), and the result follows. uunionsq
Now we finally have all the ingredients needed to prove our main theorem:
Theorem 5. The vQFHE scheme TrapTP satisfies κ-SEM-VER.
Proof. From Lemmas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, we may conclude that if t (the number of T gates in the circuit)
is polynomial in κ (the security parameter), then for any polynomial-time adversary A,
Pr[VerGameA,TrapTP(κ) = 1] − Pr[HybA,TrapTPf (κ) = 1] ≤ negl(κ),
since the sum poly-many negligible terms is negligible (it is important to note that there is only a constant
number of different negligible terms involved). By Lemma 8, which reduces verifiability of TrapTPf to
verifiability of TC, Pr[HybA,TrapTPf (κ) = 1] ≤ 1/2 + negl(κ). It follows that Pr[VerGameA,TrapTP(κ) = 1] ≤
1/2 + negl(κ), i.e., that TrapTP is κ-IND-VER. By Theorem 3, TrapTP is also κ-SEM-VER. uunionsq
6 Application to quantum one-time programs
One-time programs. We now briefly sketch an application of the vQFHE scheme to one-time programs. A
classical one-time program (or cOTP) is an idealized object which can be used to execute a function once,
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but then self-destructs. In the case of a quantum OTP (or qOTP), the program executes a quantum channel
Φ. In the usual formalization, Φ has two inputs and is public. One party (the sender) creates the qOTP
by fixing one input, and the qOTP is executed by a receiver who selects the other input. To recover the
intuitive notion of OTP, choose Φ to be a universal circuit. We will work in the universally-composable (UC)
framework, following the approach of [9]. We thus first define the ideal functionality of a qOTP.
Definition 10 (Functionality 3 in [9]). The ideal functionality FOTPΦ for a channel ΦXY→Z is the follow-
ing:
1. Create: given register X from sender, store X and send create to receiver.
2. Execute: given register Y from receiver, send Φ applied to XY to receiver. Delete any trace of this
instance.
A qOTP is then a real functionality which “UC-emulates” the ideal functionality [21]. As in [9], we only allow
corrupting receivers; unlike [9], we consider computational (rather than statistical) UC security. The achieved
result is therefore slightly weaker. The construction within our vQFHE framework is however much simpler,
and shows the relative ease with which applications of vQFHE can be constructed.
The construction. Choose a vQFHE scheme Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Eval,VerDec) satisfying SEM-VER. For
simplicity, we first describe the classical input/output case, i.e., the circuit begins and ends with full
measurement of all qubits. Let C be such a circuit, for the map ΦXY→Z . On Create, the sender generates
keys (k, ρevk)← KeyGen and encrypts their input register X using k. The sender also generates a classical OTP
for the public, classical function VerDec, choosing the circuit and key inputs to be C and k; the computation
log is left open for the receiver to select. The qOTP is then the triple
ΞXC := (ρevk,Enck(ρX),OTPVerDec(C, k)) .
On Execute, the receiver computes as follows. The receiver’s (classical) input Y together with the (public)
circuit C defines a homomorphic computation on the ciphertext Enck(ρX), which the receiver can perform
using Eval and ρevk. Since C has only classical outputs, the receiver measures the final state completely. At
the end of that computation, the receiver holds the (completely classical) output of the computation log from
Eval. The receiver plugs the log into OTPVerDec(C, k), which produces the decrypted output.
We handle the case of arbitrary circuits C (with quantum input and output) as follows. Following the ideas
of [9], we augment the above quantum OTP with two auxiliary quantum states: an “encrypt-through-teleport”
gadget σin and a “decrypt-through-teleport” gadget σout. These are maximally entangled states with the
appropriate map (encrypt or decrypt) applied to one half. The receiver uses teleportation on σinY1W1 to encrypt
their input register Y before evaluating, and places the teleportation measurements into the computation
log. After evalution, the receiver uses σoutW2Y2 to teleport the plaintext out, combining the teleportation
measurements with the output of OTPVerDec(C, k) to compute the final QOTP decryption keys.
Security proof sketch. Starting with a QPT adversary A which attacks the real functionality, we construct
a QPT simulator S which attacks the ideal functionality (with similar success probability). We split A into
A1 (receive input, output the OTP query and side information) and A2 (receive result of OTP query and side
information, produce final output). The simulator S will generate its own keys, provide fake gadgets that will
trick A into teleporting its input to S, who will then use that input on the ideal functionality. Details follow.
The simulator first generates (k, ρevk) ← KeyGen and encrypts the input X via Enck. Instead of the
encrypt gadget σinY1W1 , S provides half of a maximally entangled state in register Y and likewise in register
W . The other halves Y ′1 and W
′
1 of these entangled states are kept by S. The same is done in place of the
decrypt gadget σoutW2Y2 , with S keeping Y ′2 and W ′2. Then S runs A1 with input ρevk,Enck(ρX) and registers
Y and W . It then executes VerDeck on the output (i.e., the query) of A1 to see if A1 correctly followed
the Eval protocol. If it did not, then S aborts; otherwise, S plugs register Y ′1 into the ideal functionality,
and then teleports the output into register W ′2. Before responding to A2, it corrects the one-time pad keys
appropriately using its teleportation measurements.
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7 Conclusion
In this work, we devised a new quantum-cryptographic primitive: quantum fully-homomorphic encryption
with verification (vQFHE). Using the trap code for quantum authentication [9] and the garden-hose gadgets
of [12], we constructed a vQFHE scheme TrapTP which satisfies (i.) correctness, (ii.) compactness, (iii.)
security of verification, (iv.) IND-CPA secrecy, and (v.) authentication. We also outlined a first application of
vQFHE, to quantum one-time programs.
We leave open several interesting directions for future research. Foremost is finding more applications
of vQFHE. Another interesting question is whether vQFHE schemes exist where verification can be done
publicly (i.e., without the decryption key), as is possible classically. Finally, it is unknown whether vQFHE
(or even QFHE) schemes exist with evaluation key that does not scale with the size of the circuit at all.
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A Equivalence of κ-IND-VER and κ-SEM-VER.
In Lemma 3, it was shown that if a scheme is κ-IND-VER, then it is also κ-SEM-VER. We here provide the
full proof of Lemma 3, which states the other direction (κ-SEM-VER implies κ-IND-VER).
Proof (of Lemma 3). Suppose that a scheme S is κ-SEM-VER, and let A = (A1,A2,A3) be an arbitrary
QPT adversary for the IND-VER indistinguishability game for this scheme. By defintion of κ-SEM-VER, for
A2 there exists S such that for all QPTs M and D, the equation from Definition 5 holds with A := A2. We
chooseM and D as in the figure below. More precisely,M does: (i.) run A1 on its input (ii.) prepare the state
|0n〉〈0n|, plus a random bit r ∈R {0, 1}, and store them in the side information register R2, and (iii.) swap
the quantum states in X and R2 conditioned on r. We also choose D to (i.) run A3 on the appropriate input
wires, (ii.) either apply Φc or  on the quantum state in the register R2, conditioned on the accept/reject flag,
(iii.) swap those wires back (again, conditioned on r), and finally (iv.) output 1 if A3’s output was correct (i.e.
equal to r), and 0 otherwise.
ρevk
A1
R1
|0n〉〈0n|
X
r ∈R {0, 1} •
×
×
Ssk
c
acc(0)/rej(1)
R′1
Φc
X ′
•

Φc
•

•
×
×
A3 r′
M D
EQ(r, r′)
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Note that these choices ensure that the real channel is an execution of the IND-VER game. In the ideal
scenario, A3 receives exactly the same state in the cases r = 0 and r = 1. Hence, the best he can do is guess,
and the probability that r′ = r (and thus that D outputs 1)is at most 12 .
By the assumption that S is κ-SEM-VER, the probability that D outputs 1 in the real scenario can only
be negligibly higher than in the ideal case. As discussed above, the real scenario corresponds exactly to the
adversary A playing the IND-VER game. Therefore, the winning probability for A (i.e. the probability that
VerGameA,S(κ) = 1) is at most negligibly (in κ) higher than 12 . uunionsq
B Security of verification in TC.
The trap code is proven secure in its application to one-time programs [9]. Broadbent and Wainewright proved
authentication security (with an explicit, efficient simulator) [7]. One can use similar strategies to [7, 9] to
prove κ-IND-VER for TC.
Theorem 6. For any adversary A,
Pr[VerGameA,TC(κ) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(κ) ,
and thus TC is a κ-IND-VER secure (somewhat) homomorphic encryption scheme.
The proof (again following, e.g., [7]) will use the following lemma, the Pauli Twirl [? ].
Lemma 9 (Pauli Twirl). Let ρ be an arbitrary n-qubit state. Then for any Pauli operators P , P ′ it holds
that
1
4n
∑
a,b∈{0,1}n
(XaZb)†PXaZbρXaZbP ′†(XaZb)† =
{
PρP † if P = P ′
0 otherwise
Proof (Theorem 6). Let A = (A1,A2,A3) be an adversary for TC, for the VerGameA,S(κ) security game. Let
sk = (pi, x, z) be the uniformly random keys, with pi ∈ S3m, x, z ∈ {0, 1}3mn. Let CSS be a [[m, 1, d]] CSS
code, that can correct up to dc errors. We can let dc be the security parameter κ, and then d = 2dc + 1 and
m depends on the exact properties of CSS.
First note that for TC, the circuit c which is output by A2 cannot in any way depend on the bit r: All
qubits output by TC.Enc are encoded with the quantum one-time pad, and therefore will look completely
mixed whether or not the real or dummy input is given to A2. Also, c is measured when it is supplied to
VerDec as classical information. Therefore, we can in general view A as a probabilistic mixture of adversaries
for different choices of c. From now on, we assume that A uses an arbitrary fixed c without loss of generality
(since it can always use the circuit c that wins the game with highest probability).
Next, observe that the accept probability of VerDec within the VerGameA,S(κ) game is independent of the
random choice r. The decryption procedure only looks at the trap qubits when choosing whether to accept or
reject, and so we can imagine delaying undoing the quantum one-time pad on the data qubits until after the
accept or reject choice – which cannot depend on r at all since the encrypted data always looks completely
mixed.
In the reject case, VerDec outputs a fixed quantum state, and the quantum one-time pad that is applied to
the input of TC.Enc will never be revealed. So in that case A3 will never be able to do better than a random
guess. To prove security, it then suffices to argue that the state A2 outputs in the r = 0 case is close to the
state A2 outputs in the r = 1 case, conditioned on VerDec accepting.
Now let D be the quantum operations that are performed by the honest evaluation circuit, i.e., the list of
CNOT gates applied transversally to the encrypted qubits. Let B ∈ {I, comp, H}n describe for each logical
qubit whether it is unmeasured, measured in the computational basis, or measured in the Hadamard basis
respectively. To simplify notation, we assume without loss of generality that HR = HR′ and that A2 can be
written as a unitary operation that consists of first applying an arbitrary U acting on HR ⊗HC , and then
applying the honest actions D.
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Define MI = I
⊗m ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗m ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗m as the projector corresponding to accepting the traps of an
unmeasured qubit (after undoing the permutation and quantum one-time pad). Similarly define Mcomp =
I⊗m ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗m ⊗ I⊗m and MH = I⊗m ⊗ I⊗m ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗m as the projectors corresponding to accepting the
traps of a measured qubit.
The VerDecMeasurement function does not undo the Z part of the quantum one-time pad in case of
computational-basis measurement (or the X corrections for the Hadamard basis), making it not possible
to immediately apply the Pauli twirl (Lemma 9) as with the unmeasured qubits. Consider a scheme where
the decryption procedure for the measurement would first undo the entire quantum one-time pad, and only
measure the qubits afterward: this scheme would be functionally completely equivalent to the actual TC
scheme. (In [9] this property is called the equivalence between decode-then-measure and measure-then-decode.)
Also, note that we can write the Pauli operators and the conditional Paulis as occuring after all other gates;
because of the commutation rules between the Clifford group and the Pauli group, they will just correspond
to different Pauli operations applied later. Since the Pauli key updates only occur on the data qubits and do
not change the acceptance probability at all, we can rewrite the decryption procedure as first checking the
traps using the keys without the Paulis, and only then apply the (conditional) Paulis after the checks.
Let σ ∈ HRX be the output state of A1. Write Λ(·) = CSS.Encode(·) ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗m ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗m as the
channel representing the part of the encryption which encodes the qubits and appends the traps and define
ρ =
(
idR ⊗
⊗n
i=1 Λ
)
(σ). Now the state (IR ⊗XxZzpi⊗n)ρ(IR ⊗XxZzpi⊗n)† is the encrypted input to A2. The
plaintext that VerDec holds right before running CSS.Decode, projected to the accepting case, equals⊗
i∈[n]
MBi E
pi∈S3m
[
E
x,z∈{0,1}3mn
[pi†⊗nXfc(x)Zfc(z)DUXxZzpi⊗nρpi†⊗nXxZzU†D†Xfc(x)Zfc(z)pi⊗n]
]
where U acts on the reference system R and the ciphertext register, and all other operations only act on the
ciphertext register.5 The transformation fc represents the updating of the quantum one-time pad keys as
function of the applied circuit – these are the keys that are used by the decryption circuit.
Now define D′ as the unitary operation which applies CNOT gates transversally on the 3m+ 3m qubits
when listed in c. By construction of the key-update rules, we have that Xfc(x)Zfc(z)pi†⊗nD = D′XxZzpi†⊗n.
Using that identity and the Pauli twirl (Lemma 9) we decompose U into a probabilistic mixture of Pauli
operations: ⊗
i∈[n]
MBiD
′ E
pi∈S3m
[
E
x,z∈{0,1}3mn
[pi†⊗nXxZzUXxZzpi⊗nρpi†⊗nXxZzU†XxZzpi⊗n]
]
D′† =
⊗
i∈[n]
MBiD
′ E
pi∈S3m
[
E
P∈P3mn
[|αP |2pi†⊗n(P ⊗ UP )pi⊗nρpi†⊗n(P ⊗ U†P )pi⊗n]
]
D′†
Expressions of this form were carefully analyzed in the earlier trap-code security proofs – we will for
completeness finish our security sketch, but see, e.g., [7] for a more precise analysis.
First observe that if these Pauli operators do not change any logical qubit, this expression will be exactly
the same as the state that A3 receives in the r = 1 case – namely the claimed circuit c, as represented
by D′, the measurements, and the (conditional) Paulis that will be effectively performed by decryption,
applied to the data. Consider what form the Pauli operator P would need to change a specific logical qubit i.
First consider an unmeasured qubit i. Because CSS can correct up to dc errors, only those Paulis that are
non-identity on more than dc qubits will cause the logical qubit after decoding to change. Say without loss of
generality that this Pauli operator Pi has an X on at least dc/2 out of the 3m physical qubits that encode i.
(If the operator consists of more Z components than X components, we could argue using Z instead.) Consider
the probability for a randomly chosen pi ∈ S3m that all these X do not end up in the positions m + 1 to
2m, i.e., each misses the computational basis traps. For each X, the probability of missing all trap positions,
conditioned on no trap being hit yet, is always at most 2/3. Therefore the probability that all traps are
5 The expectation value is always taken over the uniform distribution, e.g., Epi∈S3m is nothing more than a short way
of writing 1
(3m)!
∑
pi∈S3m .
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missed is at most (2/3)dc/2. A more careful combinatorial analysis which includes the Z flips improves this to
(2/3)dc [9, 7], but this simple bound suffices for us.
Now, consider the case that i is a qubit on which a computational-basis measurement has been performed,
of which only the corresponding traps are checked. For these qubits, the Pauli Z parts of the attack are not
detected, but they also do not change the output: Since the data qubits are measured, only the X Paulis will
change anything in the data. Therefore, the operator Pi will have to contain at least dc X Paulis on the 3m
physical qubits. Now repeating the same argument as for the unmeasured qubits, we see that the probability
over a random permutation pi that all traps are missed is at most (2/3)dc . The analogous argument works for
the Hadamard-basis measurements.
To conclude, the part of the output of A2 that has been changed from that what would come out of the
honest evaluator, and still is accepted, has norm at most (2/3)dc , both in case r = 0 and r = 1. This norm
gives an upper bound to the trace distance between the states that A3 receives in the r = 0 case and the
r = 1 case, since for all lower-weight Pauli attacks these states are exactly the same (by the error-correction
property of CSS). The final guessing probability is then bounded as
Pr[VerGameA,TC(κ) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
(
2
3
)dc
.
Since we picked the parameters of CSS such that dc scaled with κ, this completes the proof. uunionsq
C Security of TC with multiple encryptions
In Section 5, we will use the IND-VER property of TC to prove verifiability for our new scheme. In order to
achieve this, we will actually need a slightly stronger notion of verifiability for TC: IND-VER-n, where the
adversary is allowed to submit plaintexts in multiple rounds, which are either all encrypted or all swapped
out. In this subsection, we show that TC also fulfills this stronger notion. For our purposes in Section 5, it
suffices to show that TC is secure against an adversary that is allowed two rounds (IND-VER-2), but the
definitions and proof trivially extend to the general case.
Definition 11 (VER-2 indistinguishability game VerGame2A,S(κ)). For an adversary A = (A0,A1,A2,A3),
a scheme S, and a security parameter κ, VerGame2A,S(κ) is the following game:
S
.K
ey
G
en
(1
κ
)
ρevk
sk
|0n2〉〈0n2 |
|0n1〉〈0n1 |
r ∈R {0, 1}
A0
R
X1
A1
R′
X2
S.Encsk
•
×
× S.Encsk
•
×
×
A2
CX′
c
log
R′′
Φc
S
.V
er
D
ec
s
k
acc(0)/rej(1)
c
X ′
•

•
×
×
A3 r′
Here, n1 and n2 are the respective dimensions of the X1 and X2 registers.
Definition 12 (κ-IND-VER-2). A vQFHE scheme S = (KeyGen,Enc,Eval,VerDec) has 2-round
κ-indistinguishable verification if for any QPT adversary A = (A0,A1,A2,A3),
Pr[VerGame2A,S(κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ negl(κ).
Here, the probability is taken over KeyGen(1κ),Enc,VerDec, and A.
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Lemma 10. TC is κ-IND-VER-2.
Proof. Let A = (A0,A1,A2,A3) be an arbitrary polynomial-time adversary for the VER-2 indistinguishability
game for TC. For notational convenience, write the secret key as sk = (pi, x1, z1, x2, z2), where x1 and z1 are
lists of 3mn1 bits, sufficient for encrypting X1, and analogously x2 and z2 are lists of 3mn2 bits.
We now slightly alter the VER-2 game in the following way. In the first encryption step of the game,
instead of providing A1 with TC.Enc(pi,x1,z1) applied to the register X1, we provide A1 with the halves of
n1 EPR pairs, and perform Bell measurements between the other halves and the qubits in X1, after they
have been CSS-encoded and permuted with traps. Let the outcomes of these measurements be given by
a, b ∈ {0, 1}3mn1 : a and b describe the effective X and Z Paulis that are applied to X1 by these teleportation
measurements. To undo these Paulis, we update sk to (pi, x1⊕a, z1⊕ b, x2, z2) at this point. Here, ⊕ is bitwise
addition modulo 2. Since the quantum one-time pad keys x1 and z1 are chosen uniformly at random, and are
completely hidden from the perspective of the adversary, the new keys x1 ⊕ a and z1 ⊕ b are valid keys that
are sampled from the same distribution. Hence, the winning probability of A is not affected by this change of
the game.
A second small change to the game is the following: instead of performing the Bell measurements and the
secret-key update immediately, it is done only after A1 has provided its query in X2. Since these actions
happen only on wires which are not accessible to A1 and otherwise also not touched in this stage of the game,
this change also does not affect the execution or outcome of the game in any way.
We have now arrived at an interesting situation: A1 only receives halves of EPR pairs, and so its choice
for X2 or R
′ is not based on the first ciphertext received from the challenger – that ciphertext will only be
generated after execution of A1. We can merge A0 and A1 into a single QPT algorithm that produces X1
and X2 simultaneously. When viewed as such, A is an adversary for the single-query VER indistinguishability
game, and we can conclude that
Pr[VerGame2A,TC(κ) = 1] = Pr[VerGameA,TC(κ) = 1].
Since we know that the latter probability is bounded by 12 + negl(κ) from Theorem 4, so is the first. uunionsq
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